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Abstract
Population aging challenges the financing of social security systems in developed
economies, as the fraction of the population in working age declines. The resulting
pressure on capital-labor ratios translates into a pressure on factor prices and pro-
duction. While European countries all face this challenge, the speed at which their
population ages differs, and thus the pressure on capital-labor ratios. If capital
markets are integrated, differences in population aging may lead to cross-country
spillovers, as investors freely seek the best returns on capital. Using a multi-country
overlapping-generations model covering 14 European Union countries, I quantify
spillovers and find that capital market integration leads to redistribution across
countries over the long run. For instance, GDP per capita would on average be
2.9 %-points lower in Germany in each of the next 50 years if capital markets were
perfectly integrated and increases in labor income taxes maintained public debt con-
stant, compared to a closed economy case; by contrast, GDP per capita would on
average be 2.1 %-points higher in France, whose population ages slower than in Ger-
many. I also show that pension reforms can change the cross-country redistribution
patterns, some countries losing from capital market integration without the reform
but winning with it. The research has policy and methodological implications.
Keywords: population aging, pensions, cross-country spillovers, policy coordination,
overlapping-generations modelling
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1 Introduction
Differences in population aging speed lead to differences in capital-labor ratios and
returns to capital, ceteris paribus. Integration of capital markets can thus lead to slow
changes in the distribution of capital across countries over time. Using a multi-country
overlapping-generations model calibrated for 14 European countries, the main goal of
this paper is to quantify cross-country spillovers due to population aging and capital
market integration. The influence of social security reforms is also investigated.
The old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase from 35% to 60% over the next
five decades in Germany, but only from 30% to 47% in France. Everything else equal,
population aging should thus increase the capital-labor ratio and depress returns to
capital more in Germany than in France. With integrated capital markets, capital should
gradually flow from Germany to France, a basic theoretical prediction (Adema et al.,
2009). There is empirical support for some of these theoretical predictions, countries with
lower dependency ratios having a smaller net foreign asset position (Higgins, 1998; Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti, 2002). Assuming integrated capital markets, quantitative simulation
studies in general equilibrium find international spillovers across world regions which
differ in demographic and institutional characteristics (e.g. Boersch-Supan et al., 2006).
Whether differences in population aging are sufficient to generate spillovers between
countries with similar institutional setups is however unknown.
The paper also uses general equilibrium quantitative simulations to answer this ques-
tion. Compared to the existing literature, there are two main differences. First, I
consider differences between countries, not only between regions of the world. Exist-
ing general equilibrium analyses with endogenous labor supply consider several world
regions, all having different economic institutions (including Fehr et al., 2005; Boersch-
Supan et al., 2006; Attanasio et al., 2007; Krueger and Ludwig, 2007; and Vogel et al.,
2017)1. Using a multi-country model calibrated for Europe allows to detect spillovers
even if institutional setups are similar. The analysis also provides a practical contribu-
tion to the policy debate, policy coordination discussions usually taking place between
countries and seldom between regions. Second, I pay particular attention to the role of
capital in production, given the focus on capital market integration. Consistent with
empirical evidence (Duffy et al., 2004), I assume capital-skill complementarity, the fact
that capital is more complementary to high-skilled than low-skilled labor2. In related
research ignoring population aging (Davoine and Molnar, 2017), we found that capital-
skill complementarity indeed increases the magnitude of output spillovers, as variations
in capital in the integrated capital market impact the domestic contribution of the most
productive type of labor3.
1Some of these models also have one country among several regions. There exist also some general
equilibrium quantitative evaluations with multi-country models and endogenous labor supply, as opposed
to multi-regions models, but they do not assess the impact of capital market integration (Catalano and
Pezzolla, 2016). Other models with exogenous labor supply exist, but only consider variations of the
the numerator of the capital-labor supply ratio.
2Capital-skill complementarity also helps to account for wage inequality variations over time (Krusell
et al., 2000). The approach here has similarities with Jin (2012): allowing usage of capital in production
to differ across countries, she provides a theory which can help to rationalize the direction of international
capital flows.
3A third difference with the existing literature is the focus on redistribution between countries (or
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Concretely, the first goal of the paper is to quantify cross-country spillovers due
to population aging and capital market integration within the European Union, taking
into account major demographic and economic variations in the rest of the world. The
second goal is to assess the influence of social security reforms on the spillovers, while
the third goal is to assess the influence of differences in reforms across countries. Policy
implications are then derived from these assessments.
To achieve these goals, I use a multi-country overlapping-generations model devel-
oped in related research (Davoine and Molnar, 2017). The basis is an Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) model with endogenous labor supply decisions, three exogenous skill
classes, capital-skill complementarity and detailed social security features. As in Buiter
(1981) and Boersch-Supan et al. (2006), labor is assumed to be immobile but capital mo-
bile in perfectly integrated capital markets, which leads to international spillovers. The
model is calibrated for a representative sample of 14 European Union countries and two
stylized Rest-of-the-world regions, one representing developed countries and the other
developing countries.
Simulations show that differences in population aging and capital market integration
lead to visible cross-country spillovers, even when institutional settings are comparable.
For instance, GDP per capita is projected to be an average of 2.9 %-points lower in
each of the next fifty years in Germany when capital markets are integrated and labor
taxes increased to keep public debt constant, compared to a closed economy case with
separated capital markets. On the other hand, GDP per capita would on average be
2.1 %-points higher in France under integrated capital markets. The reason are aging
differences: as the population is projected to age faster in Germany, labor supply will
be reduced faster, the capital-labor ratio increased more and thus the returns to capital
depressed further; investors will gradually shift their asset holdings away from Germany
and towards France, which sustains production there.
I also find that cross-country redistribution patterns depend on social security re-
forms. For instance, GDP per capita is projected to be 1.9 %-points lower in Denmark
with capital market integration when public debts are kept constant by increases in
labor income taxes, but 0.8 %-points higher when public debts are kept constant by
an increase of the retirement age and a (smaller) increase in labor income taxes (in
all countries). In other words, Denmark would be a long-term loser of capital market
integration if the unique reform was on the labor tax code, but a winner if retirement
age was also increased. The main reason is the current size of the Danish welfare state,
which requires a high level of taxation. In the first case, the disincentive effect of higher
taxes is strong and dominates other effects. In the second case, the tax increase is milder
and the disincentive effect too, so that the slow population aging effect dominates.
As a related result relying on the same mechanisms, I find that capital market inte-
gration changes the ranking of pension reform options in some countries. For instance,
regions) in overall macroeconomic terms. Fehr et al. (2005), Attanasio et al. (2007) and Krueger and
Ludwig (2007) also provide information on redistribution, but this information is either not part of
the discussion (first two studies) or the discussion is restricted to the impacts on capital markets (last
study). By contrast, I consider the overall macroeconomic impact, summarized by the usual GDP per
capita indicator.
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simulations show that labor tax increases are preferable to a 20% cut in pension benefits
in Belgium with no integration, but the opposite with full capital market integration:
instead of cutting pensions, implementing tax increases leads to an average 0.7 %-points
gain in GDP per capita in each of the next 50 years without integration, but a yearly
0.4% loss with integration.
The paper also provides a methodological result, concluding that the closed economy
assumption is preferable to the small open economy assumption in single-country models
for assessing the long run impact of population aging. Additional results shed some
light on the benefits of cross-country coordination. For instance, simulations show self-
inflicted penalties for countries who would attempt free riding, letting other countries
increase retirement age and hoping to benefit from spillovers.
The paper continues as follows. The next section presents the model. Section 3
describes the experiments and provides their results. Section 4 derives coordination and
policy implications while section 5 concludes.
2 Model
To quantify the cross-country spillovers of population aging and associated social security
reforms, I use a multi-country overlapping-generations model, presented in Davoine and
Molnar (2017). The only difference is the calibration of aging-related processes, including
demographics and anticipated social security reforms. Below I summarize the model and
then present the aging-related calibration in details. Details on the model can be found
in Davoine and Molnar (2017).
2.1 Model overview
The basis is a large-scale single-country overlapping-generations model which is used
regularly for policy evaluation4. The model is then extended to a multi-country version
following the procedure developed by Buiter (1981) and later applied in a number of
general equilibrium analysis, such as Boersch-Supan et al. (2006).
The single-country model is an overlapping-generations model in the Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) tradition. As unemployment varies across countries, the single-country
model starts from Jaag et al. (2010), an overlapping-generations model with imperfect
labor markets. Because the skill distribution also differs across countries, this basis is
extended to include three skill classes with exogenous education decisions5.
Concretely, households in the model take consumption and labor related decisions
to maximize lifetime utility. Once their education is completed, households decide to
participate in the labor market or not; if they participate, they choose search efforts
to find a job; if they have a job, they decide how many hours to work. Retirement is
exogenously defined. Representative firms maximize discounted future profits through
investment and hiring decisions. In a static search-and-matching framework, workers
4See for instance Berger et al. (2016), which quantifies the long run public finance contribution of
immigration in four European countries.
5There is also a version of the model with endogenous education decisions, which follows Heckman
et al. (1998).
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and firms bargain over the wage. Governments collect social security contributions as
well as labor income taxes, capital income taxes, firm income taxes and consumption
taxes. Government revenue is used to finance its own expenditures, welfare benefits,
unemployment insurance, age-dependent health- and long-term care, as well as public
pay-as-you-go pensions with a flat part and an earnings-related part. All policy param-
eters are exogenously defined, with one exception: one parameter is chosen and varies
endogenously to meet a public debt target. Consistent with empirical evidence, pro-
duction exhibits capital-skill complementarity. Production output is a single composite
good.
For the multi-country extension of the model, the main assumption is that labor is
immobile but capital is perfectly mobile. This assumption can be relaxed by allowing
mobility of labor with exogenously defined international flows, as will be done in the
quantitative analysis. One also assumes that all countries produce the same composite
good and that they either belong to the same currency union, or that exchange rates
are constant.
Our implementation covers 14 countries from the European Union6. Although this
subset defines a large economic compound, it is still insufficient to be isolated from
the world capital markets. A pair of stylized Rest-of-the-world countries (or regions)
is included in the model to capture the influence from the world capital market. One
such region represents developed countries (the North Rest-of-the-world) and the other
developing countries (the South Rest-of-the-world), which not only differ in economics
and policy terms, but also in population structure and the speed at which they age7.
Under these assumptions, there is a unique world interest rate in equilibrium: in-
vestors ship investments abroad if the home interest rate is initially too low, which
depresses the capital-labor ratio at home and increases it abroad and gradually closes
any interest rate differential until it disappears. Note that in models with a single
composite good, trade flows and investment flows are identical.
2.2 Aging-related calibration
Calibration of the model is presented in Davoine and Molnar (2017), with exception of
aging-related processes, which I describe here.
I choose fertility and mortality rates for the 14 European countries in the model to
match the demographic projections from Eurostat (Eurostat, 2015), which are used in
the Ageing Working Group (2015). Fertility and mortality rates for the two Rest-of-the-
world countries are chosen to match the projections from the United Nations (2015).
6Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic*, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
Poland*, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden* and the UK*. In this list, stars identify the four countries whose
currency is neither the Euro nor pegged to the Euro, and thus do not meet our assumption of fixed
exchange rates. We keep these countries in the list to have broader diversity. In reality, exchange rate
variations absorb some of the country-specific shocks, reducing the size of cross-country spillovers for
these four countries, ceteris paribus. Our quantitative analysis illustrates for these countries what would
be some consequences of joining the Eurozone.
7Concretely, we calibrate the North Rest-of-the-world country by averaging values for Canada, Japan
and the US, while the South Rest-of-the-world country is calibrated with average values for Brazil, China
and India. With these choices the model overall captures close to 60% of the actual real world GDP
and 40% of the total trade of the EU.
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A number of European countries have scheduled pension reforms, in order to deal
with the future financing challenges created by an aging population. Typically, the
statutory retirement age is scheduled to be increased and pension benefits reduced8.
In order to quantify cross-country spillovers due to population aging alone and isolate
them from policy reforms influences, pension parameters will be kept unchanged in
some scenarios. By contrast, scheduled pension reforms, as consolidated by the Ageing
Working Group (2015), will be used in other scenarios involving policy reforms.
Public health- and long-term care are also expected to change over time. There is
a large debate over cost drivers and how they will change in the future. Unlike pen-
sion expenditures however, there are cost drivers which are neither demographic nor
economic, such as technological progress. In its reference scenario, the Ageing Working
Group (2015) assumes that age-dependent per capita costs will be declining. Because
social security policy has little (direct) influence on technological improvements, I there-
fore follow these projections and apply a gradual age-dependent per capita reduction of
health- and long-term care costs9.
3 Quantitative results
This section presents the experiments performed to quantify cross-country spillovers
with aging populations and associated reforms required to ensure the financing of welfare
states. Parts of the experiments are also relevant for a discussion of policy coordination.
The approach is presented first and results for each experiment next. At the end of the
section, a methodological note is provided. Policy coordination is discussed in section 4.
For ease of reading, results and discussion will be focused on four countries illustrat-
ing the range of possible outcomes, namely Belgium, Denmark, France and Germany.
Results for the other countries in the sample, provided in appendices, are similar and so
are their explanations. I report and discuss evolutions between 2015 and 2065, to allow
for comparisons with the benchmark results of the Ageing Working Group (2015)10 ,11.
3.1 Approach
I use the multi-country overlapping-generations model presented in section 2 to perform
simulations. Under population aging, I consider several scenarios which ensure the
financial sustainability of the welfare state over the long run and compare two cases.
In the first case, capital markets are perfectly integrated. In the second case, capital
markets are not integrated. Instead of assuming small open economies, I assume in the
second case that trade with foreign countries remains constant in per capita terms, which
8Social security contributions rates are seldom scheduled to change, if at all (Ageing Working Group,
2015).
9Because the project focuses on demographic and economic components and not on health technology
components, which may differ across countries, I apply the same reduction to all countries, taking the
projections for Germany from the Ageing Working Group (2015).
10For technical reasons, simulations are made over 200 rather than 50 years, to allow for a stationary
steady state at the end of the period. Results over the first 50 years are not influenced.
11Two simulation rounds have been performed. Tiny differences are possible between numbers for
identical scenarios presented in different sections. The analysis and magnitudes are unaffected.
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corresponds to isolated closed economies12 ,13. The reason for avoiding the small open
economy assumption will become clear in section 3.4. The comparison of outcomes in
the two cases will allow to identify benefits (or losses) from capital market integration
under an aging population.
I consider three types of simulations. In the first, I simulate outcomes when all
countries perform the same reform (possibly with different magnitudes). In particular,
simulations of this kind help to quantify cross-country spillovers. In the second kind, I
consider reforms which may differ by country. Simulations will provide information on
cross-country policy coordination. In the last kind of simulations, I perform simulations
to make a methodological point. Details of the scenarios will be presented below. The
only constant element in all scenarios is the use of labor income taxes to keep public
debt constant: if a particular reform was insufficient to avoid an increase in debt, taxes
are increased on top of it14.
3.2 Results with identical reforms across countries
3.2.1 Population aging and tax scenario
Population aging creates a financing challenge for welfare states, as the proportion of
households in working age is reduced: without any reforms, social security revenue
declines while expenditures for public pay-as-you-go pensions, healthcare and long-term
care increase, threatening the financial sustainability of welfare systems (Ageing Working
Group, 2015). In the first scenario presented here, we assume that no social security
reforms take place, so that labor income taxes need to be increased to finance the social
security system. Specifically, taxes are adjusted so that public debt remains constant.
Figure 1 and table 1 provide the results for the two cases, in a multi-country environ-
ment where capital markets are integrated and in a single-country closed environment
where capital markets are separated for each country15.
The key finding is as follows:
Finding 1. Capital market integration with an aging population and variations in labor
income taxes to keep public debt constant lead to international spillovers and redistri-
bution across countries over the long run: some countries benefit from capital market
integration (up to 2.1 %-points higher GDP per capita on average in each of the next 50
years, compared to a closed economy) while others lose (up to 4.8 %-points lower GDP
per capita).
For instance, table 1 shows that the GDP per capita should drop 4.9% in yearly
12In the second case, a standard single-country model can be used. The same model is used for
simulations in the two cases however, either in its multi-country version (with integrated capital markets)
or in its single-country version (without capital market integration).
13I choose to keep constant trade per capita rather than no trade at all, as in strictly closed economies,
because I want economies to be the same at the start in the two cases, to be able to compare outcomes.
14If a reform would bring so much gains that debt would decrease, then taxes are lowered to keep
public debt constant.
15In all figures and tables, GDP per capita figures represent deviations from the long run growth
trend.
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Figure 1: Aging and labor tax reforms, GDP per capita variations, 2015-2065
Belgium Denmark France Germany
2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065
CE MC CE MC CE MC CE MC
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.60 0.60
Retirement age 59.6 59.6 59.6 62.7 62.7 62.7 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.6 60.6 60.6
Pension benefits* 0.0 -1.1 -3.6 0.0 0.6 -1.8 0.0 -1.5 0.1 0.0 11.8 8.0
Labor tax 0.15 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.52 0.51 0.10 0.28 0.28 0.09 0.29 0.30
Labor/capita* 0 -10 -10 0 -14 -14 0 -13 -12 0 -16 -18
Interest rate* -53 -40 -36 -22 -39 -36 0 -26 -36 -10 -59 -36
Capital/capita** 0.0 2.6 -2.0 0.0 4.8 -1.2 0.0 -2.0 2.1 0.0 10.4 2.0
GDP/capita** 0.0 -3.6 -4.9 0.0 -4.1 -6.1 0.0 -4.9 -2.8 0.0 -1.2 -4.1
GDP/capita gap*** -1.3 -1.9 2.1 -2.9
Legend: * = variation in 2065, compared to 2015 (in %); ** = average variation over years 2015 to 2065, compared
to 2015 (in %); *** = average percentage points variation over years 2015 to 2065, compared to 2015; Pension
benefits = average pension expenditure per retiree; Labor tax = average labor income tax for employed workers;
Labor/capita = effective worked hours per capita; GDP/ capita gap = difference between CE and MC cases; CE =
single-country with closed economy; MC = multi-country with perfect capital market integration.
Table 1: Aging and labor tax reforms, 2015-2065
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average between 2015 and 2065 in France when capital markets are not integrated (cor-
responding to a closed economy case) but only 2.8% when capital markets are integrated
(in a multi-country setting). In yearly average thus, the GDP per capita is 2.1 %-points
higher with capital market integration. By contrast, all other countries reported in the
table lose from capital market integration, average GDP per capita being 1.3 %-points
lower in Belgium, 1.9 %-points lower in Denmark and 2.9 %-points lower in Germany.
In our sample, the biggest gain is in France and the largest loss in the Netherlands (at
4.8 %-points, see appendix A).
The main explanation is differentials in demographic dynamics. The old-age de-
pendency ratio in Germany is projected to increase from 0.35 to 0.60 over the next 50
years for instance, but only from 0.30 to 0.47 in France over the same time span. The
rapid decline in labor supply in Germany increases the capital-labor ratio fast, and thus
depresses returns on capital investment faster than in France (and other countries). In
an integrated capital market, investors thus modify their portfolio over time, shifting
investments from Germany to France (until the unique international interest rate is
equalized). The capital stock thus drops in Germany and increases in France, relative
to a closed economy case. GDP per capita variations follow. Figure 5 in appendix B
illustrates the explanation chain with the transition path of key variables.
This explanation applies to France, Germany and most of the countries in our sample.
There are however a few exceptions, namely Belgium, Denmark and Italy. The first two
are aging slowly so should benefit from capital market integration, yet lose. The opposite
applies to Italy. Another factor also plays a role in all three cases, namely taxation and
its associated Laffer curve effect. I take the example of Denmark to illustrate.
Denmark ages slowly, its dependency ratio being projected to increase from 0.29 to
0.42 over the next five decades. One would expect Denmark to benefit from capital
market integration, as France. However, its initial level of taxation is so high that
the necessary increase in taxes to finance increasing social security expenditures has a
strong negative impact on labor supply incentives (Laffer curve effect). To finance its
large welfare state indeed, Denmark needs to set labor income taxes and social security
contributions at a cumulated effective rate of 40% for employed workers (while the second
highest rate is 30% in our sample and the average is 25%). The effect is strong enough
to dominate the benefits from a slowly aging population, relative to other countries.
Taking all margins into account (demographics, working hours,...), the net labor supply
drops more in Denmark than the average in other countries. As for Germany then, the
capital-labor ratio increases faster, returns to investment decline more and thus capital
moves overtime from Denmark to other countries, which are aging slowly and have a
milder exposure to Laffer curve effects.
The following remark will play a role in the discussion of policy coordination. In this
scenario and for our sample, there are winners and there are losers, but the weighted
average GDP per capita gains and losses is close to zero: five countries benefit from
capital market integration (for an average GDP per capita gain of 1.2 %-points) and
nine countries lose from it (for an average loss of 1.8 %-points; see appendix A). Capital
market integration is, in this sense, a zero sum game.
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Figure 2: Aging and labor tax reforms without and with retirement age increase, GDP
per capita variations, 2015-2065
3.2.2 Retirement age, tax and aging scenario
Increasing the statutory retirement age is one way to ensure the financial sustainability
of the social security system with an aging population, as revenue from social security
contributions increase and pension expenditures decline. I investigate the impact of the
same retirement age reform in all countries (except the two Rest-of-the-world countries,
which use labor income taxes to finance increasing social security expenditures). Specif-
ically, the retirement age is gradually (linearly) increased by a total of 2.5 years over
the next 50 years, the 2.5 years mark corresponding to the average scheduled retirement
age in the countries from our sample (as per the Ageing Working Group, 2015). This
increase may or may not be sufficient to finance all of the increase in social security
expenditures. If it is not, labor income taxes are increased so that public debt remains
constant.
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Belgium Denmark France Germany
2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065
CE MC CE MC CE MC CE MC
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.60 0.60
Retirement age 59.6 62.1 62.1 62.7 65.0 65.0 60.2 62.7 62.7 60.6 63.1 63.1
Pension benefits* 0.0 -0.2 -0.5 0.0 2.5 1.2 0.0 5.3 7.4 0.0 21.4 17.5
Labor tax 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.44 0.42 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.09 0.22 0.22
Labor/capita* 0 -2 -1 0 -5 -4 0 -3 -3 0 -8 -9
Interest rate* -27 -45 -41 -14 -29 -41 0 -37 -41 -9 -84 -41
Capital/capita** 0.0 2.1 2.9 0.0 5.7 4.2 0.0 2.7 7.6 0.0 16.3 7.2
GDP/capita** 0.0 -1.2 0.5 0.0 -0.9 -0.2 0.0 0.2 2.9 0.0 4.0 1.1
GDP/capita gap*** 1.8 0.8 2.7 -2.9
Legend: see table 1
Table 2: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, 2015-2065
Figure 2 and table 2 provide the results. The figure reproduces the results from
the scenario where aging is financed with labor income taxes only (from section 3.2.1),
which is used as benchmark. Again results are provided for two cases, in a multi-country
environment where capital markets are integrated and in a single-country closed economy
where capital markets are separated by country.
There are two key findings. The first one is similar to finding 1 in section 3.2.1. It
does not provide new insights but is included for the sake of completeness:
Finding 2. Capital market integration with an aging population, a gradual increase of
the retirement age of 2.5 years in all European countries and variations in labor income
taxes to keep public debt constant lead to international spillovers and redistribution across
countries over the long run: some countries benefit from capital market integration (up
to 3.1 %-points higher GDP per capita on average for each of the next 50 years, compared
to a closed economy) while others lose (up to 3.8%-points lower GDP per capita).
As shown in table 2 for instance, the GDP per capita should increase 0.2% on average
between 2015 and 2065 in France when capital markets are not integrated (corresponding
to a closed economy case) and 2.9% when capital markets are integrated (in a multi-
country setting). The GDP per capita is thus on average 2.7 %-points higher with
capital market integration. By contrast, average GDP per capita is 2.9 %-points lower
in Germany with integrated capital markets. Results for our entire sample show that the
biggest gain is 3.1 %-points in Italy and the biggest loss 3.8 %-points in the Netherlands
(see appendix A).
The explanation for this finding is similar to the explanation for finding 1, based
on demographics differentials: labor supply per capita drops faster in countries whose
population ages fast, increasing more the capital-labor ratio and thus depressing more
returns to investment, triggering a capital flight when markets are integrated, and thus
a loss in production capacity in those countries.
The next finding, best visible in figure 2, shows that redistribution patterns created
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by capital market integration depend on the exact reforms which ensure the financial
sustainability of social security systems:
Finding 3. Losses from capital market integration with an aging population are over-
turned (into gains) for some (but not all) countries when all European countries increase
gradually the retirement age by 2.5 years, rather than relying solely on variations in la-
bor income taxes to keep public debt constant: while the average GDP per capita in
Austria, Belgium and Denmark is respectively 0.05, 1.3 and 1.9 %-points lower with
capital market integration and a constant retirement age than with separated markets,
it is respectively 1.3, 1.8 and 0.8 %-points higher with capital market integration and
increased retirement age than with separated markets (yearly averages over the next 50
years).
The explanation for this finding is similar for all three countries, with a twist for
Austria. I take the example of Denmark, continuing on the explanation for finding 1
in section 3.2.1: Denmark is aging slowly but has a high tax burden, so that the labor
supply disincentive effects (Laffer curve) of increased labor taxes dominate the gains
from a slowly aging population, relative to other countries. When the retirement age
is increased, taxes do not need to be increased so much, so the Laffer curve effects are
dampened and dominated by the gains from the slow aging process: relative to the
average European country, labor supply per capita does not drop as much, the capital-
labor ratio does not increase as much so the returns to investment increase over time in
Denmark; capital flows over time to Denmark, boosting production.
The twist for Austria is the following hypothesis16. The aging process in Austria is
not particularly slow (but neither fast). Compared to other countries however, Austria
makes a relatively strong use of capital in production, which helps to keep returns to
investment high there and thus attracts foreign investments.
I conclude this section with a remark. The increase in the retirement age reduces the
GDP loss per capita due to aging (and sometimes even transform the loss into gains),
as production factors are larger. The outcome, which holds with and without capital
market integration, is well known in the public finance literature (see for instance Jaag,
Keuschnigg, and Keuschnigg, 2010).
3.2.3 Pension benefits, tax and aging scenario
The three standard parametric reforms of the pension systems are changes in the retire-
ment age, changes in pension benefits and changes in social security contribution rates.
Increases in the retirement age to maintain the financing of the social security system
with an aging population have been investigated in section 3.2.2. Here I investigate cuts
in pension benefits17. Specifically, I assume that the benefit ratio is gradually decreased
over the next 50 years in all European countries of the sample, so that it is 19% lower in
16To be confirmed with a quantitative decomposition analysis, left for future research.
17I do not investigate increases in social security contribution rates on their own, because outcomes
are in general similar to increases in labor income tax rates, investigated in section 3.2.1.
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Figure 3: Aging and labor tax reforms without and with pension cuts, GDP per capita
variations, 2015-2065
50 years18. The figure corresponds to the projected decrease in all countries of the sam-
ple, as per the Ageing Working Group (2015). The cuts reduce the pension expenditures
but may or may not be sufficient to balance social security expenditures with revenues,
as aging unfolds. If they are not, labor income taxes are increased so that public debt
remains constant.
Results are provided in figure 3 and table 3 for the two cases, multi-country with
capital market integration and single closed economy without integration. As before,
the figure reproduces the results from the benchmark scenario where aging is financed
with labor income taxes only.
18Following the Ageing Working Group (2015), the benefit ratio is the average pension as a share of
the average wage. In the simulation, I change the pension replacement rate in the same proportion as
the benefit ratio is projected to change, ignoring general equilibrium effects (that is, assuming constant
average wages). To illustrate, a country where the benefit ratio is 0.500 today would reduce it to 0.405
in 50 years (a 19% drop).
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Belgium Denmark France Germany
2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065 2015 2065
CE MC CE MC CE MC CE MC
Dependency ratio 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.30 0.47 0.47 0.35 0.60 0.60
Retirement age 59.6 59.6 59.6 62.7 62.7 62.7 60.2 60.2 60.2 60.6 60.6 60.6
Pension benefits* 0.0 -20.1 -21.3 0.0 -17.7 -19.6 0.0 -19.5 -18.1 0.0 -8.6 -11.7
Labor tax 0.16 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.48 0.47 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.09 0.25 0.26
Labor/capita* 0 -9 -9 0 -12 -12 0 -12 -11 0 -16 -17
Interest rate* -43 -32 -36 -21 -36 -36 0 -25 -36 -11 -58 -36
Capital/capita** 0.0 0.6 -1.7 0.0 4.9 -0.6 0.0 -1.9 2.3 0.0 10.2 2.1
GDP/capita** 0.0 -4.5 -4.5 0.0 -3.8 -5.5 0.0 -4.6 -2.5 0.0 -1.2 -4.1
GDP/capita gap*** 0.0 -1.7 2.1 -2.9
Legend: see table 1
Table 3: Aging, pension benefits and labor tax reforms, 2015-2065
With one exception, outcomes are very similar to the scenario where the welfare
state is kept financially sustainable by increases in labor income taxes only, presented
in section 3.2.1. The same finding can be applied here. In the interest of space, I do not
repeat it.
The exception is as follows:
Finding 4. Pension cuts in all European countries do not change the redistribution
pattern created by capital market integration under an aging population where variations
in labor income taxes keep public debts constant (as outlined in finding 1), with a minor
exception: while Belgium loses from integration without pension cuts (yearly GDP/capita
on average 1.0 %-points lower over the next 50 years), the impact of integration is neutral
with pension cuts in all European countries (yearly GDP/capita on average neither lower
nor higher).
The finding, which is based on simulation results from tables 1 and 3, is explained as
follows. For all countries but Belgium, pension cuts decrease aggregate pension expen-
ditures and do not require as large an increase in labor income taxes, and thus do not
depress labor supply incentive as much. But this benefit takes place with and without
capital market integration. Demographic differentials thus continue to play a driving
role (see section 3.2.1).
In Belgium, the smaller increase in labor income taxes is sufficient to change the
balance of the two factors which dominate variations in effective labor supply. As seen
for Denmark in section 3.2.1, when pension benefits are maintained, the high initial tax
burden and large increase in labor taxes lead to strong Laffer curve effects with a large
negative impact on labor supply, increasing the capital-labor ratio more than in other
countries and thus lowering returns to investments, in spite of a slower aging of the
population. When pension benefits are cut, labor income taxes do not need to be raised
as much, which reduces the Laffer curve effect. In this case, the balance of the Laffer
curve effect and slow population aging is tilted, so that the capital-labor ratio and thus
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returns to investment in Belgium change in the same proportion as the average of other
countries. Capital market integration then has a neutral impact.
3.3 Results with different reforms across countries
In this section, reforms differ across countries. The differences come from implementation
or not of a reform, the timing, the magnitude or the type of the reforms.
3.3.1 Deviations by one country
Simulations in section 3.2 showed that cross-country spillovers take place because coun-
tries age at a different speed, because tax burdens differ and because capital markets are
integrated. In particular, investors change their portfolio composition over time to seek
the highest returns, generally where the capital-labor ratio is increasing least. Countries,
in this sense, compete for capital. There may be thus incentives for strategic behavior.
In order to attract capital, countries may try to be the only country to perform a reform,
or the only one to avoid a reform.
In this section, I investigate the impact of such strategic behavior, when one country
deviates by implementing (or not implementing) one type of social security reform.
Increases in the retirement age depress the capital-labor ratio and thus increase returns
to investment. It may be strategic to be the only country to perform a retirement age
increase. I thus take variations in retirement age as the reform which one country is
alone to implement (or avoid implementing). Since Germany has the biggest economic
size and is one of the countries which suffers most from capital market integration, I
select it as the country seeking strategic advantage. As always, labor income taxes are
changed in all countries so that public debts remain constant.
Results are provided in table 4, showing average macroeconomic impacts, measured
by yearly average GDP per capita variations over the next five decades, in Belgium,
Denmark, France and Germany, for four different scenarios. Two scenarios have been
previously presented and are used as benchmarks: either no country increases retirement
age (from section 3.2.1) or all countries gradually increase retirement age by 2.5 years
(from section 3.2.2). The other two scenarios are new: either Germany is the only
country to gradually increase retirement age by 2.5 years (first mover scenario), or it is
the only country which does not do it (avoider scenario).
What the simulations show can be summarized in the following way:
Finding 5. Deviations in retirement age reforms by one country lead to redistribution
between that country and other countries to a small absolute extent, without any overall
efficiency gain: Germany, as a first mover country (i.e. alone to increase retirement
age) would gain an average 0.2 %-points GDP/capita in each of the next 50 years while
other countries would lose on average 0.01 %-points; Germany would lose 0.2 %-points
if it was an avoiding country (i.e. the only one to avoid a retirement age increase) and
other countries gain on average 0.01 %-points; in each case, gains are offset by losses
over the entire set of countries.
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GDP/capita, 2015-2065 Belgium Denmark France Germany
Retirement age increase in . . .
. . . no country -4.87 -6.07 -2.77 -4.09
. . . only in Germany -4.88 -6.10 -2.78 1.24
. . . all except Germany 0.56 -0.14 2.90 -4.27
. . . all countries 0.55 -0.16 2.88 1.06
Gaps for scenario. . .
. . . Germany first mover -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.18
. . . Germany avoider 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.18
Legend: the table shows average GDP/capita variations over years 2015 to 2065,
compared to 2015 (% or percentage points); see text for additional details.
Table 4: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, Germany deviation, 2015-2065
I start the explanation with impacts on the deviating country (Germany). When it
is the only country to make the retirement age reform (first mover scenario), the average
GDP/capita increases by 1.24 % over the next 50 years. When all other countries also
implement this reform, the average GDP/capita gain in Germany is 1.06%. Being a first
mover thus delivers a 0.2 %-points gain. Conversely, when the deviating country is the
only one to avoid the reform (avoider scenario), GDP/capita drops on average by 4.27%;
when all other countries also avoid the reform, GDP/capita drops by 4.09% in Germany.
Therefore, being an avoider leads to a 0.2 %-points loss.
The intuition is symmetric when it is a first mover or an avoiding country. I provide
it for the first mover case. Population aging reduces labor supply in all countries. When
Germany is the only one which increases retirement age, the relative decline in labor
supply is smaller there. In relative terms thus, the capital-labor ratio declines less
in Germany, which increases the returns to investment there: capital flows gradually
towards Germany, an additional support to production.
Note that the magnitude of the gain (first mover) or loss (avoider) is small compared
to the loss due to capital market integration with an aging population: 0.2 %-points
instead of about 3.0 %-points (see sections 3.2.1 or 3.2.2). The main reason is that aging
differentials lead to larger variations in labor supply, compared to variations generated
by the retirement age reform.
The explanation for the impacts on the other countries (all except Germany) are
reversed and similar. I thus briefly provide them. When the deviating country is alone
to increase retirement (first mover case), GDP/capita drops on average by 4.88% in
Belgium; when no country increases retirement, GDP/capita drops by 4.87% in Belgium.
Thus, the first mover case leads to a 0.01 %-points loss in Belgium. The loss is similar in
Denmark, France and all other countries (unreported). The reason for the losses is just
the opposite of the reason for the gains in the deviating country: there, the returns to
investment are increasing in relative terms, explaining why capital flows slowly towards
the deviating country.
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GDP/capita, 2015-2065 Belgium Denmark France Germany
Retirement age increase in . . .
. . . no country -4.87 -6.07 -2.77 -4.09
. . . in seven reformer countries 0.67 0.02 -2.84 1.19
. . . all countries 0.55 -0.16 2.88 1.06
Gaps for country. . .
. . . among seven reformers 0.12 0.18 - 0.13
. . . not among seven reformers - - -0.07 -
Legend: the table shows average GDP/capita variations over years 2015 to 2065,
compared to 2015 (% or percentage points); the following countries increase the
retirement age in the seven reformers case: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland,
the Netherlands, Poland and Spain; see text for additional details.
Table 5: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, seven countries, 2015-2065
3.3.2 Deviations by several countries
As in the previous section, I consider the case where only some countries increase the
retirement age. The rationale is similar: as countries compete for capital, strategic
behavior where capital-labor ratios and thus returns to investment are improved may
be rewarded. I investigate the quantitative benefits of such strategic behavior, if any.
Specifically, I consider a case where half of the 14 European countries gradually increase
the retirement age by 2.5 years, while the other half does not. As usual, public debts
are kept constant in all countries through variations of the labor income tax rate.
Table 5 provides outcomes of the experiment. In addition to the scenario considered
here, outcomes for two other scenarios are presented for comparison purposes, namely
when all countries gradually increase the retirement age and when no country does it.
Outcomes for these two benchmark scenarios, which come respectively from sections
3.2.2 and 3.2.1, are repeated for convenience.
In the table, the largest impacts are for France and Germany. France is not among
the seven reformer countries and suffers from the deviation. Indeed, when no country
increases the retirement age, GDP per capita drops on average by 2.77% in each of the
next fifty years. When the seven reformers increase the retirement age, GDP per capita
drops on average by 2.84%. France thus loses a yearly average of 0.07%-points of GDP
per capita when other seven countries gradually increase the retirement age.
Germany on the other hand is among the group of seven reformers. Its GDP per
capita increases on average 1.19% over the next five decades, when the seven reformers
increase retirement age. By comparison, GDP per capita increased 1.06% when all
countries increased the retirement age. The benefit from being among the seven reformer
countries thus amounts to a yearly average of 0.13 %-points, in GDP per capita terms.
The outcome for Belgium and Denmark, other reform countries, is similar to the
outcome for Germany (respectively 0.12 and 0.18 %-points yearly average gains). Col-
lecting and adding outcomes from the other 10 countries in the sample (unreported),
one can summarize the experiment in the following way:
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GDP/capita, 2015-2075 Belgium Denmark France Germany
Retirement age increase in . . .
. . . with lags in some countries 0.28 -0.61 0.53 0.01
. . . all countries at same time 0.29 -0.60 2.22 0.01
Gaps . . .
. . . when using lags -0.01 -0.01 -1.69 0.00
Legend: the table shows average GDP/capita variations over years 2015 to 2075,
compared to 2015 (% or percentage points); the following countries delay the
increase of the retirement age by 10 years: Austria, the Czech Republic, France,
Italy, Slovakia, Sweden and the United Kingdom ; see text for additional details.
Table 6: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, reform lags, 2015-2075
Finding 6. There are small benefits for countries among the sample half increasing the
retirement age (up to a yearly average GDP/capita gain of 0.2 %-points over the next
50 years, compared to the case where all countries do it) and small losses for countries
outside the sample (up to a yearly average GDP/capita loss of 0.1 %-points over the next
50 years, compared to the case where no countries does it).
The same mechanism as for finding 3 operates and explains finding 6, namely a
relative decrease of the capital-labor supply ratio among the seven reformer countries
raising the retirement age, which increases returns to investment there and thus attracts
foreign capital (see section 3.2.2 for details).
3.3.3 Differences in timing
When all countries gradually increase the retirement age, capital-labor ratios drop ev-
erywhere, pushing up returns to investment everywhere and thus producing a drag on
the integrated capital markets. If some countries delayed the gradual increase in the
retirement age, one could hope that the pressure on the capital markets would be lower,
easing investments, the demand on the capital markets being lower at any given point
in time (but over a longer period of time). In this section, I investigate whether such a
coordination approach delivers any efficiency gains.
Results are presented in table 6, which includes two scenarios. First, there is a
scenario where the implementation of the reform is delayed by 10 years in half of the
country sample. Second and for comparison purposes, the scenario where there is no
lag in implementation is repeated for convenience from section 3.2.2. Contrary to other
experiments however, the reporting period is 10 years longer (from 2015 to 2075), be-
cause the gradual increase in the retirement age finishes 10 years later in countries with
implementation lags.
The results are, to some extent, striking. In countries where there is no lag in
implementation, there is no difference in outcomes: in Belgium, Denmark and Germany,
the yearly average GDP/capita impact over the next 60 years is the same, whether some
countries lag the reform implementation or not. In countries where there is a lag in the
implementation, the outcomes are worse: in France for instance, GDP/capita increases
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on average by 0.53% in each of the next 60 years when the reform is lagged, but increases
by 2.22% without implementation lag, a 1.7%-points average differential. Outcomes are
similar in the rest of the sample. Simulation results can thus be summarized by:
Finding 7. Delaying the implementation of increases in the retirement age in half of the
countries leads to counterproductive outcomes, as impacts are worse for countries which
delay the implementation (GDP/capita is between 1.2 and 1.7 %-points lower averaged
over the next 60 years, compared to no delays) and unchanged for countries which do
not delay the implementation (same GDP/capita impacts whether other countries delay
the implementation or not).
The fact that capital stock adjustment is a slow process explains the outcomes. When
some countries delay the increase in the retirement age by 10 years, there are capital
outflows towards other countries during these 10 years (see explanation for finding 6,
in the previous section), but this is not sufficient to generate permanent and significant
re-balancing of international investment portfolios. Capital stock variations over time
are thus comparable when some countries delay implementation of the reform and when
they do not. This is sufficient to explain why there are no differences for non-lagged
countries. In the lagged countries, delaying the increase in retirement age simply leads
to a lower increase of the labor supply, and thus a relative loss in production.
3.3.4 Differences in magnitudes
Other than differences in country scope and timing, one can consider differences in
reform magnitudes across countries. In this section, I compare the implementation of
pension cuts that countries currently plan (as per the Ageing Working Group, 2015)
with implementation of the same average pension cut (as in section 3.2.3). Over the
sample of countries considered in this paper, own reform plans range from a 2% cut of
the pension benefit ratio over the next 50 years (Belgium) to a 39% cut (Poland), the
average being a 19% cut.
Table 7 provides the results, providing outcomes for reforms of own magnitude, of the
same average magnitude, when capital markets are integrated and when they are not.
Unlike in other result tables, outcomes are provided for Poland but not for Denmark, to
better illustrate the variety of impacts.
As the table shows, outcomes differ when countries implement a reform of differ-
ent magnitude, which is not a surprise. This result holds whether capital markets are
integrated or not. The only exception is Germany, due to the fact that the scheduled
pension cuts in Germany (-17%) are very close to the average over the entire sample
(-19%). More interesting is the comparison of outcomes when capital markets are inte-
grated and when they are not, which can be summarized in the following fashion:
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GDP/capita, 2015-2065 Belgium France Germany Poland
Integrated markets, pension cuts of . . .
. . . own magnitude -4.85 -2.44 -4.11 -8.28
. . . average magnitude -4.50 -2.53 -4.12 -8.64
Gaps own vs average -0.36 0.08 0.01 0.36
Separate markets, pension cuts of . . .
. . . own magnitude -3.71 -4.57 -1.23 -6.87
. . . average magnitude -4.45 -4.64 -1.24 -7.13
Gaps own vs average 0.74 0.07 0.01 0.26
Legend: the table shows average GDP/capita variations over years 2015 to 2065,
compared to 2015 (% or percentage points); the average magnitude is -19%; the own
magnitude in Belgium is -2%, in France -24%, in Germany -17%, in Poland -39%;
see text for additional details.
Table 7: Aging, pension benefits and labor tax reforms, different magnitudes, 2015-2065
Finding 8. In a few countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Poland and Sweden),
capital market integration changes the gap between pension cuts of own magnitude and
pension cuts of the same average magnitude (to an extent comprised between 0.1 and
1.0 %-points of the yearly average GDP/capita variations over the next 50 years); in
one case (Belgium), capital market integration even changes which of the two reform
scenario is preferable (own cut by a yearly 0.7 %-points margin in separated markets,
average cut by a yearly 0.4 %-points margin in integrated markets).
Outcomes are most striking for Belgium. When capital markets are integrated, its
own pension cut of 2% would lead to a yearly average GDP/capita loss of 4.85% over the
next 50 years; if all countries implement the average cut of 19%, the yearly loss is 4.50%.
According to production criteria, Belgium would thus support a policy coordination
measure where all countries implement the same average cut of 19%, which would lead
to a yearly average GDP/capita gain of 0.4 %-points in the country. If capital markets
were isolated, its own pension cut would lead to a yearly average loss of 3.71%, while the
average cut would lead to a yearly average loss of 4.45%. Belgium would not support
the same policy coordination if capital markets are not integrated, to avoid a 0.7 %-
points yearly average loss of GDP/capita. The overall GDP/capita differential created
by capital market integration is a yearly average larger than 1.0 %-points over the next
50 years, a significant number.
The explanation for such an outcome has two steps. Notice beforehand that the
own pension cut of -2% is very small, so that this scenario is close to no pension cut
at all, variations in labor income taxes alone ensuring the financial sustainability of
social security over the long run. To simplify the exposition, I thus compare a tax hike
scenario with the average pension cut scenario. First, tax hikes can be preferable to a
19% pension cuts in a closed economy setting, where capital markets are separated. Each
of the two options have advantages and disadvantages. Tax hikes directly reduce labor
supply incentives. Pension benefit cuts reduce the value of accumulated pension rights
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in pay-as-you-go pension systems with earnings-related components, so indirectly reduce
labor supply incentives. Which of the negative and positive effects dominate depends
on the specifics of the tax and pension systems. One remarkable feature in Belgium
is that the tax and social security contribution burden is distributed relatively evenly
over the life-cycle, retirees being exposed to an average cumulative rate which is 90% of
the average cumulative rate of working households. By comparison, the (unweighted)
average is 56% in the other countries of the simulation sample. Unlike in other countries,
financing with labor income taxes is preferable to financing with pension cuts.
The second step involves capital market integration. Another effect weighs on the
balance between tax hikes and pension cuts. The same mechanism operates as in section
3.2.3. Pension cuts move the country away from strong Laffer curve effects, reducing the
negative impact of aging on labor supply, pushing down the capital-labor ratio and thus
increasing returns to investments. With integrated capital markets, pension cuts lead
to capital inflows, sustaining domestic production. Simulations show that this effect is
sufficiently strong to change the balance between tax hikes and pension cuts in favor of
pension cuts.
The mechanism is the same in the other countries, but smaller in magnitude. In the
Czech Republic, Poland and Sweden, there are quantitative but no qualitative changes.
Note in particular that own pension cuts in Poland are larger than the average cut, so
the signs are reversed: unlike Belgium, own cuts are preferable to average cuts when
capital markets are integrated.
3.3.5 Differences in reform types
In a national context, it is well-known that different types of pension reforms (increase
in retirement age, pension benefit cuts or increases in social security contributions) have
different outcomes, some positive and others negative. Simulations above showed that,
in an international context, there are cross-country spillovers when capital markets are
integrated. They also showed that spillovers depend on the type of pension reforms. One
could thus consider cases where different types of reforms are implemented in different
countries, in the hope of generating positive spillovers.
I thus consider a mixed reforms case where a gradual increase of 2.5 years of the
retirement age takes place in some countries, gradual 19% cuts of pension benefits take
place in other countries and the rest gradually increases the social security contribution
rates by 39%. As always, labor income taxes are adjusted (if needed) to keep public debts
constant. In other words, the reform from section 3.2.2 is applied to the first group of
countries, the reform from section 3.2.3 is applied to the second group of countries while
a reform similar to the one from section 3.2.1 is applied to the last group of countries19.
Key results are presented in table 8. For comparison purposes and convenience, re-
sults from previous sections are also reported. Unlike other tables, outcomes for Poland
19For better comparisons, the simulations should be adjusted so that the last group of countries
applies exactly the same reform as in section 3.2.1, using labor income taxes only (and no change of
social security contributions). Alternatively, a new scenario where all countries gradually increase 39%
the social security contribution rates should be performed. This is left for future research. Outcomes
are however expected to be very close to the scenario presented here, labor taxes and social security
contributions influencing labor supply in a similar fashion.
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GDP/capita, 2015-2065 Belgium France Germany Poland
Reform scenarios . . .
... mixed reforms 0.68 -2.46 1.20 -9.23
... pension cuts everywhere -4.50 -2.53 -4.12 -8.64
... retirement age increase everywhere 0.55 2.88 1.06 -3.66
... SSC / labor tax increase everywhere -4.87 -2.77 -4.09 -8.97
Gaps between mixed reforms and. . .
... pension cuts everywhere - 0.07 - -
... retirement age increase everywhere 0.13 - 0.14 -
... SSC / labor tax increase everywhere - - - -0.26
Legend: the table shows average GDP/capita variations over years 2015 to 2065,
compared to 2015 (% or percentage points); in the mixed reforms case, retirement
age increases take place in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany and
Spain, pension cuts take place in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Slovakia and
Sweden, while social security contributions are raised in the rest of European
countries; see text for additional details.
Table 8: Aging and different reforms across countries, 2015-2065
are presented in the table rather than those for Denmark, the former being more illus-
trative than the latter. Results can be summarized in the following way:
Finding 9. Implementing different types of pension reforms across countries does not
lead overall to better outcomes, compared to the implementation of identical reforms
in all countries, since gains and losses are small and gains for those countries imple-
menting rewarding reforms (retirement age increases, up to yearly 0.15 %-points higher
GDP/capita averaged over the next 50 years) are offset by losses for those countries
implementing other reforms (social security increases, up to yearly 0.26 %-points lower
GDP/capita averaged over the next 50 years).
I discuss impacts in Germany and Poland, the largest in the table. Impacts in
other countries are similar. Consider Germany first, which implements an increase in
retirement age. Consistent with outcomes in previous sections, this reform extracts
benefits from other countries not implementing this reform: yearly GDP per capita
increases by 1.20% on average over the next 50 years, compared to a 1.06% increase
when all countries increase the retirement age, a 0.14 %-points differential. In Poland,
the mixed reform case where social security contributions are increased in the country
leads to an average yearly drop of 9.23%, compared to a 8.97% loss when all countries
balance their social security budget with a similar instrument (namely labor income
taxes), a negative 0.26 %-points differential.
The same mechanism operates as in previous sections (see for instance section 3.3.2)
and explains the finding: those countries increasing the retirement age are able to re-
duce the increase in the capital-labor ratio due to population aging, which leads to
higher returns to investment and thus attracts capital from countries not increasing the
retirement age.
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3.4 Methodological results
To assess the macroeconomic impact of population aging and associated policy reforms,
models need to have an overlapping-generations structure and to quantify factor prices.
Indeed, what leads to aging is variations in mortality rates. Further, the main economic
impact of population aging is an exogenous variation of labor supply, which affects
capital-labor ratios and thus wages and interest rates. General equilibrium models deal
endogenously with wage variations. Most models are also capable of dealing with interest
rate variations, but only under some assumptions. I discuss these assumptions in this
section and show that the commonly used small open economy assumption may not be
satisfactory, as it exaggerates in the majority of the countries the negative economic
impact of population aging, sometimes overpredicting yearly GDP per capita declines
by more than 10 %-points for each of the next 50 years. At the end of the section, I also
include a small remark on alternative assumptions in single-country models.
Most general equilibrium models are calibrated for one region or one country, and
virtually all large-scale models used for policy evaluation with an aging population apply
to single countries20. Single-country models put a price on labor assuming that labor
is immobile or that migration flows are exogenous. In reality, labor is mobile but much
less than capital, which allows to defend the assumption. There is however no unique
approach to putting a price on capital in single-country models. One can either assume
that capital is immobile and obtain closed economy equilibria. Or one can invoke the
small open economy assumption, arguing that countries are open to trade and capital
flows but are usually too small to influence the worldwide price of capital, in which case
the interest rate is exogenously set (and usually constant).
To evaluate these two single economy assumptions, I compare the outcomes they
generate over the long run with those coming from the multi-country model used above,
which serves as benchmark. Below I report and discuss outcomes for only one scenario,
with population aging and variations in labor income taxes. Results are nearly identical
for the other scenarios with variations in retirement age or in pension benefits.
Figure 4 and table 9 provide the results. Outcomes for the closed economy case
(labeled Closed) and the multi-country case with integrated capital markets (labeled
Multi) are identical to section 3.2.1 and repeated to simplify comparisons. The new case
makes the small open economy assumption (label SOE ).
The figure illustrates and numbers in the table confirm the fact that outcomes with
single-country models differ from the multi-country benchmark, especially when the
small open economy assumption is used. For instance, the single-country model with the
small open economy assumption predicts a drop of GDP per capita averaging 14.2% for
each of the next 50 years in Denmark, compared to a drop of 4.1% in the closed economy
case and 6.1% in the multi-country case with integrated capital markets: the small open
economy assumption is thus 10.1 %-points more pessimistic in the first instance and 8.2
%-points in the second one. Over the entire sample, the largest gaps are for Spain, at
20QUEST, from the European Commission, is a large scale multi-country model used for policy
evaluation but does not have an overlapping-generations structure (see Ratto et al., 2009). I am not
aware of a large scale multi-country overlapping-generations model used for policy evaluation.
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Figure 4: Aging and labor tax reforms in three cases, GDP per capita variations, 2015-
2065
Belgium Denmark France Germany
SOE CE MC SOE CE MC SOE CE MC SOE CE MC
Labor tax 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.57 0.52 0.51 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.29 0.30
Assets/capita** 6 10 24 12 33 40 13 33 40 22 48 50
Labor/capita** -13 -10 -10 -19 -14 -14 -15 -13 -12 -22 -16 -18
Interest rate* 0 -40 -36 0 -39 -36 0 -26 -36 0 -59 -36
Capital/capita** -9.1 2.6 -2.0 -12.2 4.8 -1.2 -8.1 -2.0 2.1 -9.1 10.4 2.0
GDP/capita** -9.9 -3.6 -4.9 -14.2 -4.1 -6.1 -9.4 -4.9 -2.8 -10.6 -1.2 -4.1
GDP/capita gap*** 6.3 5.1 10.1 8.2 4.5 6.6 9.4 6.5
Legend: SOE = single-country with small open economy assumption; CE = single-country with closed economy;
MC = multi-country with perfect capital market integration; * = variation in 2065, compared to 2015 (in %); ** =
average variation over years 2015 to 2065, compared to 2015 (in %); *** = average percentage points variation over
years 2015 to 2065, compared to 2015; GDP/ capita gap = difference with SOE case. See also table 1
Table 9: Aging and labor tax reforms in three cases, 2015-2065
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respectively 12.0 and 11.0 %-points (see appendix A).
The outcomes can be summarized as follows:
Finding 10. Long run projections of the impact of population aging where labor income
taxes are used to keep public debts constant are more pessimistic under the small open
economy assumption than either the closed economy assumption or perfect capital market
integration assumption, sometimes by a significant margin: in 9 countries out of 14, the
predicted GDP per capita for each of the next 50 years drops at least 6 %-points more
with the small open economy assumption than either of the two other assumptions; in
one case, the gap is larger than 11 %-points.
The reason for such an outcome is directly tied to the assumptions on the interest
rate. Life expectancy increases with population aging. With a constant retirement age,
households increase saving to maintain consumption after retirement, an intertemporal
smoothing mechanism (as evidenced by the assets per capita variation). When the
interest rate is flexible (closed economy and multi-country cases), the increasing supply
of capital drops its price, which stimulates investment, builds the capital stock and thus
reduces the GDP per capita drop21. When the interest rate is constant (small open
economy case), there is no such investment stimulation mechanism.
The finding has the following methodological implication for the small open economy
assumption. In reality, capital markets are neither completely separated (as in the closed
economy case) nor perfectly integrated (as in the multi-country case). The creation of
the Euro has however increased capital market integration, ahead of goods market inte-
gration and far ahead of labor markets integration (Lane, 2006). Further, capital markets
have become more integrated for several decades not only in the Eurozone, but outside
as well (Longin and Solnik, 1995). Over the long run thus, the multi-country model sim-
ulations with perfect capital market integration provide a useful benchmark, arguably
close to the future reality. Population aging being a slow and long-run phenomenon, the
bias from projections with the small open economy assumption is too large to be ignored.
By contrast, the gap is smaller with the closed economy assumption. When projections
can only be made with a single-country model, the closed economy assumption should
thus be used and the small open economy assumption avoided. Besides, the small open
economy assumption may only be valid if one further assumes that the population in
the rest of the world is not aging, which is not the case. One should just keep in mind
that the closed economy assumption may come with a small to moderate optimistic bias
in fast aging countries.
I finish the section with another methodological implication, this time on the closed
economy assumption in single-country models, using results in section 3.3.4. As summa-
rized in finding 8, small 2% pension cuts are preferable in Belgium when capital markets
are separated, but larger 19% cuts when capital markets are integrated. When capital
markets are integrated, the yearly average loss amounts to 1 %-points of GDP/capita
21There is a related additional reinforcing mechanism: the increase of the capital stock pushes the
capital-labor ratio up, thus increasing the wages and stimulating labor supply, which further contributes
to sustaining production.
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over the next 50 years, when the small rather than the large pension cuts are imple-
mented.
From a methodological standpoint, if markets were perfectly integrated, using a
single-country model with the closed economy assumption would lead to wrong policy
recommendations, with an average yearly cost of 1%-points of GDP/capita over five
decades. The same mistaken recommendation would be reached with the small open
economy assumption. As noted above, markets are not yet fully integrated, but have
become more integrated in recent decades. If the trend continues, the use of single-
country models for policy analysis will become problematic, whether one uses the small
open economy assumption or the closed economy assumption. In that case, multi-
country models with appropriately integrated capital markets will become necessary.
Whether such models are already necessary depends on the extent to which capital
markets are currently integrated, an open empirical and modelling question left for
future research.
4 Coordination and policy implications
Implications for policy reforms and coordination are derived from the results in the
previous section. I start with an overview and then proceed to details, for each category
of implication. A few implications are very similar, differing sometimes only in the
formulation. These different formulations are presented here, as the best formulation
can depend on the concrete policy case.
Before presenting the implications, it is useful to remember that there were restric-
tions to the international mobility of capital only a few decades ago and that they have
been gradually removed, increasing the integration of capital markets. The creation
of the Euro in particular has lead to a marked integration of these markets, ahead of
the integration of the product markets and far ahead of the integration of the labor
markets (Lane, 2006). However, capital markets are not yet fully integrated (Morelli,
2010; Gropp and Kashyap, 2010). Whether full integration takes place is also a matter
of policy. There are for instance calls for measures supporting greater integration (e.g.
Veron and Wolff, 2016).
4.1 Overview
Simulation results have six main implications:
• capital market integration leads to cross-country spillovers and creates losers and
winners over the long run, generating new country coalition patterns
• capital market integration strengthens the need for social security reforms due to
population aging in some countries, and reduces it in other countries
• capital market integration changes the ranking of pension reform options for some
countries
• capital market integration makes increases of the retirement age a more interesting
reform option in all countries
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• There are rewards for early implementers of retirement age increases (and penal-
ties for late implementers), due to capital market integration and cross-country
spillovers
• If countries hold coordination discussions on pensions, they should also discuss
capital market integration at the same time
Other implications can be derived. Repeating the six main implications for the sake of
completeness, coordination and policy implications can be classified into four categories.
The complete overview and classification is the following:
Implications for pension reforms:
- capital market integration changes the ranking of pension reform options for some
countries
- capital market integration makes increases of the retirement age a more interesting
reform option in all countries
- For some countries with a high tax burden, capital market integration makes labor
tax or social security contributions increases less interesting options
Implications for implementation:
- capital market integration strengthens the need for social security reforms due to
population aging in some countries, and reduces it in other countries
- There are rewards for early implementers of retirement age increases (and penal-
ties for late implementers), due to capital market integration and cross-country
spillovers
- Losers from capital market integration should be first movers (on retirement age
increases)
- capital market integration makes uncoordinated increases in retirement age a vir-
tuous cycle
Implications for policy coordination:
- capital market integration leads to cross-country spillovers and creates losers and
winners over the long run, generating new country coalition patterns
- If countries hold coordination discussions on pensions, they should also discuss
capital market integration
- Countries in coordination discussion should watch out on first movers, not on late
implementers (of retirement age increases)
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Other implications and remarks:
- Spreading out the implementation of retirement age increases over time in the hope
of reducing the stress on integrated capital markets only delivers losses
- There are no additional benefits due to capital market integration from implement-
ing different types of pension reforms across countries (no free lunch)
- So far, no efficiency gains from coordination have been identified (in production
per capita terms), but welfare gains have not (yet) been considered and efficiency
gains with other coordination experiments have not been ruled out
It may be useful to remind that the simulation experiments, which lie behind the im-
plications, have all been performed in a modelling setting where the only international
spillovers take place through an integrated capital market. Capital is simply assumed
to be free to move from country to country without restriction. Labor migration on the
other hand is exogenously defined and there is no monetary policy, thus no monetary
policy interaction effects. One can thus replace the words capital market integration
by the words cross-country spillovers in each of the implications presented above (and
remove duplicates where needed). Which formulation to keep depends on the intended
use of the results.
The remainder of this section provides a discussion for each of these thirteen impli-
cations, category by category.
4.2 Implications for pension reforms
Every pension reform option comes with advantages and disadvantages. Pension cuts
for instance help to keep taxes low and thus labor supply and production high, but
increase the risk of old-age poverty. Increases in the retirement age have the most
favorable impact on production without detrimental distributional consequences but may
not conform with workers preferences. Tax and social security contributions increases
may be more in line with these preferences but have a negative impact on labor supply
incentives and thus production. These general statements hold whatever the organisation
of capital markets. The difference with capital market integration is that the way to rank
the different pension reforms options needs to be changed, when one uses impacts on
production as evaluation criteria. Governments may thus have to change their reform
evaluations as capital markets become more and more integrated. The implications
discussed below provide guidance on evaluation revisions.
Implication: capital market integration changes the ranking of pension reform op-
tions for some countries.
The simulation results behind this implication are summarized in section 3.3.4. For
instance, simulations show that labor tax increases are preferable to a 20% cut in pension
benefits in Belgium with no (low) integration22, but the opposite with full (strong)
22More specifically, labor taxes increase alone are preferable to a combination of 20% cuts in pension
benefits and (milder) increase in labor taxes. See section 3 for details.
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capital market integration: instead of cutting pensions, implementing tax increases lead
to an average yearly 0.7 %-points gain in GDP per capita over the next 50 years without
integration, but a yearly 0.4% loss with integration. The key reason is that pension
cuts have one more benefit under capital market integration: the smaller Laffer curve
effect leads to smaller drops in labor supply and returns to investment, whose benefits
can only be reaped when foreign investors make use of the integrated capital markets to
invest more in Belgium.
Implication: capital market integration makes increases of the retirement age a more
interesting reform option in all countries.
This implication is derived from various simulation results contained in section 3,
in particular findings 5 and 6. Cross-country spillovers indeed generate rewards for
countries increasing retirement age while it generates penalties for countries which do
not. Further discussion is provided below (section 4.3).
Implication: For some countries with a high tax burden, capital market integration
makes labor tax or social security contributions increases less interesting options.
Various simulation results from section 3 stand behind this implication. Recall first
that increases in retirement age, cuts in pension benefits, increases in social security
contributions or labor income taxes are the main reform options. According to finding
5 and 6, there are additional benefits from increasing the retirement age when capital
markets are integrated. According to finding 4, some countries with a high tax burden
can avoid the negative impacts of capital market integration with pension cuts. Labor
tax and social security increases are thus less interesting in that context. Differences
between these reform options are of particular importance for countries with an initially
high tax burden, given the importance of Laffer curve effects in this case (see section
3.2.1 for details).
4.3 Implications for implementation
Once a reform option is chosen, it needs to be implemented. Some options come with a
larger political cost than others, for several reasons. For instance, the use of the general
budget, indirectly relying on labor income or capital income taxes, is less visible and
thus less likely to generate opposition from parts of the population than some reforms
of social security, such as retirement age increases. In this section I investigate to which
extent cross-country spillovers can help implementation processes.
The second policy implication is directly derived from simulation results and then
generates two further implications.
Implication: capital market integration strengthens the need for social security re-
forms due to population aging in some countries, and reduces it in other countries.
Simulations results summarized in section 3.2.1 lead to this policy implication. The
three standard pension reforms to ensure the long-term financing of the public pay-
as-you-go pension systems are increases in retirement age, cuts in pension benefits and
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increases in social security contributions. These reforms are generally more visible to the
voter than the use of the general government budget to finance social security deficits,
either through debt or tax increases. On many counts however, the passive approach
of relying on the general budget delivers worse economic outcomes than active social
security reforms. Section 3.2.1 presents one such passive case, where labor income tax
variations ensure the financing of increasing social security expenditures when popula-
tions are aging. The key result is that outcomes are even worse in some countries when
capital markets are integrated, because they age faster, are submitted to a worse drop
in labor supply, larger increase in the capital-labor ratio, bigger drop in returns to in-
vestment, and thus capital outflows. For instance, GDP per capita in the Netherlands
is projected to be an average 4.8 %-points lower in each of the next fifty years with full
capital market integration (compared to no integration at all). In that country, inte-
gration makes the need for social security reforms bigger. On the other hand, capital
market integration helps some countries. GDP per capita is projected to be an average
2.1 %-points higher in France with capital market integration, which thus reduces the
need for social security reforms.
Implication: There are rewards for early implementers of retirement age increases
(and penalties for late implementers), due to capital market integration and cross-
country spillovers.
The simulation results which lead to this implication are summarized in sections
3.3.1 and 3.3.2. The yearly rewards and penalties remain moderate, simulations finding
an average yearly gain or loss in GDP per capita of around 0.2 %-points over the next 50
years. Accumulated over years or decades, these differences can however become notable.
Increases in retirement age before (resp. after) other countries mitigate (resp. worsen)
the drop in labor supply per capita due to aging, compared to other countries. This
leads to a smaller (resp. larger) relative increase in the capital-labor ratio and larger
(resp. smaller) relative increase in returns to investment, attracting (resp. pushing
away) capital from the integrated market.
Implication: Losers from capital market integration should be first movers (on retire-
ment age increases).
As noted in section 3.2.1, capital market integration leads to redistribution from fast-
aging to slow-aging countries, ceteris paribus. The previous policy implication, rewards
for early implementers of retirement age increases, is thus of particular relevance for fast-
aging countries, which can use early implementation as a way to reduce the negative
redistributive impacts.
Implication: capital market integration makes uncoordinated increases in retirement
age a virtuous cycle.
This implication is a consequence from the second policy implication in this subsec-
tion. Assume production is the main evaluation criteria. Increases in the retirement age
is the preferable pension reform option. In several countries, implementation of such
reform are difficult, as it can face opposition from a fraction of the population, often a
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sufficient threat for politicians with a high priority on re-election. If only a few countries
are successful in implementing such a reform, other countries will pay a penalty, which
makes status quo in these countries increasingly costly, an incentive for them to imple-
ment retirement age increases sooner rather than later. This virtuous cycle is automatic
and does not rely on coordination between countries.
4.4 Implications for policy coordination
First, capital market integration depends to some extent on policy arrangements, includ-
ing differences across countries. Investor protection for instance differs across countries.
Further integration of the markets thus depends on international coordination of pol-
icy reforms. Second, our simulations show that there are cross-country spillovers due
to differences in the speed of population aging and to country-specific tax and pension
policy. If countries want to tackle jointly the cross-country redistributive effects of aging
differentials and social security policy, international coordination is needed. Below I
provide implications for such policy coordination efforts, and note that discussions on
the two topics, capital market integration and social security reforms, are related.
Implication: capital market integration leads to cross-country spillovers and creates
losers and winners over the long run, generating new country coalition patterns.
Section 3.2.1 leads to this implication. Redistribution generated by capital market
integration over the long run is sizable: for instance, when labor income taxes are used
to cover the social security costs of population aging, capital market integration leads
to yearly average gains in GDP per capita exceeding 2 %-points in some countries over
the next 50 years, and yearly losses larger than 4 %-points in other countries. From our
sample of 14 countries, five benefit from integration (Finland, France, Italy, Sweden and
the UK), one essentially is not impacted (Austria) and eight lose (Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Spain).
In most cases, the first group of countries ages slower and is thus exposed to a slower
increase of the capital-labor ratio, leading to higher relative returns to investments and
attracting capital from other countries.
Recall that capital markets are not yet fully implemented and that further integration
is, to some extent, a matter of policy coordination, such as harmonization of investor
protection. The dividing line between countries which benefit or lose from capital market
integration over the long run is not the same as the lines which separate countries on
other topics of economic policy. There are different views on social security conditions
attached to labor market integration, for instance. Typically, less developed countries
are not interested in setting the higher social security standards that more developed
countries expect. There are however both less and more developed countries which stand
to lose from further capital market integration. Capital market integration thus creates
different coalition patterns.
Implication: If countries hold coordination discussions on pensions, they should also
discuss capital market integration at the same time.
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This implication follows from simulation results summarized in section 3.3.4. Cur-
rently, European Union countries have scheduled different adjustments of their pension
benefit schemes (see Ageing Working Group, 2015). Belgium, for instance, plans a small
decrease of 2% of its pension benefit replacement rate, while the average over the 14
countries of the simulation sample is a decrease of 19%. Assume EU countries hold dis-
cussions to harmonize the adjustment of pension reforms and consider an option where
all countries implement this average 19% cut. Then Belgium would lose a yearly aver-
age 0.7 %-points of GDP per capita over the following 50 years if capital markets were
not integrated, but gain an average 0.4 %-points if these markets were fully integrated.
The yearly average differential is 1 %-point over the next 50 years, a significant num-
ber. Whether capital markets are fully integrated or not would change the position of
a country like Belgium. Coordination discussions on pension reforms should thus be
held at the same time as discussions on the policy measures furthering the integration
of capital markets. In the case of pension benefit reforms, the stronger the measures to
further integrate capital markets, the larger the support from Belgium to strong cuts of
pension benefits23.
Implication: Countries in coordination discussion should watch out on first movers,
not on late implementers (of retirement age increases).
Simulation results leading to this implication are presented in sections 3.3.1 and
3.3.2. This implication is the coordination version of the second implication in section
4.3, rewards for early implementers and penalties for late implementers. Countries which
want to neutralize redistribution due to differences in implementation timing should thus
pay attention and speed up coordination discussion when there are early implementers,
but not if some partners delay implementation. As noted in section 4.3, the yearly
production rewards or losses are moderate, but can accumulate to notable values over the
years. Thus, the need for discussions does not immediately follow early implementation.
However, the longer the delay in discussions, the longer the accumulation of rewards by
early implementers.
4.5 Other implications and remarks
This section provides other policy implications from the simulation results which are no
less important but negative, rather than positive. In other words, it discusses reform
ideas which do not work. The section also provides a remark on potential gains from
coordination.
Implication: Spreading out the implementation of retirement age increases over time
in the hope of reducing the stress on integrated capital markets only delivers losses.
Simulation results summarized in section 3.3.3 stand behind this policy implication.
A higher retirement age increases the labor supply, depress the capital-labor ratio and
thus increase returns to investment. If all countries raise the retirement age at the
23It is beyond the scope of this project to make a comprehensive evaluation of pension reforms
coordination options. Analyses of the impact for all countries of the European Union, for each reform
type, is left for future research.
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same time, the drag on capital markets is large. One could thus hope that spreading
out retirement age reforms over time would deliver some efficiency gains, by reducing
the stress on capital markets. Simulations shows that the opposite happens, mostly
because significant capital stock variations require a lot of time, so that implementation
lags bring little gains from temporarily re-balancing international investment portfolios;
instead, factor supply gains in countries delaying retirement age reforms are simply lost
(see section 3.3.3 for details). The idea of spreading out retirement age reforms over
time should simply be dropped.
Implication: There are no additional benefits due to capital market integration from
implementing different types of pension reforms across countries (no free lunch).
Section 3.3.5 leads to this implication. The paper showed that cross-country spillovers
lead to redistribution across countries and that they are influenced by the type of pen-
sion reforms. One could hope that the implementation of different types of reforms in
different countries generate some gains. Finding 9 shows that no such thing happens.
In other words, there is no free lunch from diversity in reform types across countries.
Remark: So far, no efficiency gains from coordination have been identified (in produc-
tion per capita terms), but welfare gains have not (yet) been considered and efficiency
gains with other coordination experiments have not been ruled out.
One question in the project was the quantification of (potential) gains from coor-
dination of economic policy under aging populations. When the gains are measured
in efficiency terms (production per capita), experiments carried out in section 3 have
not identified any coordination gains. Some countries indeed gain over the long run
from capital market integration, other countries lose, but it is a zero sum game: scaling
by economic size, the weighted average yearly impact on GDP per capita is close to
zero24. However, it could be a positive sum game (coordination gains) with other policy
experiments. The research presented here has not ruled out such a possibility.
The point of view of governments, which tend to focus on GDP as main indicator
for economic policy, has been taken in this project. The point of view of households,
who balance consumption gained through labor with leisure, was out of the scope of the
research. Welfare analyses could thus reveal that capital market integration, with or
without the social security reforms considered in section 3, deliver coordination gains,
measured in welfare terms. For instance, countries with a slow aging population, which
benefit from cross-country redistribution via the integrated capital markets, could in-
crease the retirement age less than other countries, losing some of the capital and pro-
duction gains but winning with leisure. Welfare gains in all countries might thus be
possible. This investigation is left for future research.
24One can verify it for instance by a weighted average of values in each of the last columns of the
tables in appendix A. The sum might slightly differ from 0 due to precision. See also the end of section
3.2.1.
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5 Concluding remarks
This document summarizes the results of a research project on international spillovers
due to capital market integration when population ages, using a multi-country overlapping-
generations model calibrated for 14 European Union countries.
The first key finding is that differences in population aging speed generate redistribu-
tion across countries. When no social security reforms take place and labor income taxes
are increased to ensure sustainable public finances, GDP per capita can be more than
4 %-points lower under perfect capital market integration in fast aging countries than
under completely separated capital markets, as yearly average over the next five decades.
In slow aging countries, GDP per capita can be more than 2 %-points higher. Labor
supply indeed drops more in fast aging countries, pushing up the capital-labor ratio
more, which depresses returns to investment more and generates capital flows towards
slow aging countries, supporting production there.
The second key finding is that tax and pension policy influence redistribution pat-
terns. Some countries lose from capital market integration when no social security reform
is implemented, but gain from it when the same reform is implemented in all countries.
Finally, capital market integration influences the relative performance of different
tax and social security reforms. In particular, it makes retirement age increases a more
interesting option. In some countries, labor tax increases are preferable to pension cuts
under separated capital markets, while it is the opposite with fully integrated capital
markets.
The research also has methodological implications. In particular, it shows that the
small open economy assumption, frequently used for quantitative analysis with single-
country models, leads to pessimistic biases which can exceed 10 %-points, in yearly
average GDP/capita terms over the next five decades.
An immediate policy implication is that capital market integration increases the need
for social security reforms in some countries, but eases it in other countries. Capital
markets are not yet completely integrated. Countries which want to tackle jointly the
redistribution effects of population aging thus need to discuss social security reforms and
deeper capital market integration at the same time.
The research can be continued in different directions. I mention some of the most
interesting options. First, welfare analyses can be performed. In this paper, the point
of view of governments was taken, which tend to focus on production and public finance
outcomes. Although the analyses did not rule out potential efficiency gains from coordi-
nation, it did not find any. One could take the point of view of households, looking for
potential welfare gains from coordination. Second, an endogenous migration component
can be added. In this paper, international migration is taken as given, from demographic
projections. In reality, capital-labor ratios and thus wages will be increasing more in fast
aging countries. Migration towards fast aging countries should thus increase, reducing
the magnitude of cross-country redistribution.
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A Appendix: overview of results for all countries
This appendix provides an overview of the results for all countries for the main scenarios,
focusing on the main macroeconomic indicator (average GDP/capita variations over the
next 50 years). The legend of the tables follows those of tables 1 and 9.
Dependency ratio GDP/capita change (%)
2015 2065 Average 2015-2065
SOE CE MC Gap
MC-SOE
Gap
MC-CE
Austria 0.28 0.50 -15.7 -8.1 -8.1 7.6 0.0
Belgium 0.29 0.41 -9.9 -3.6 -4.9 5.1 -1.3
Czech Republic 0.27 0.51 -13.3 -6.0 -7.6 5.7 -1.6
Denmark 0.29 0.42 -14.2 -4.1 -6.1 8.2 -1.9
Finland 0.31 0.45 -8.7 -3.4 -2.6 6.0 0.8
France 0.30 0.47 -9.4 -4.9 -2.8 6.6 2.1
Germany 0.35 0.60 -10.6 -1.2 -4.1 6.5 -2.9
Italy 0.34 0.54 -13.1 -5.9 -4.6 8.5 1.3
Netherlands 0.28 0.48 -15.0 -3.1 -7.9 7.1 -4.8
Poland 0.24 0.58 -12.9 -7.4 -9.0 4.0 -1.6
Slovakia 0.22 0.53 -15.2 -7.8 -8.8 6.3 -1.1
Spain 0.29 0.63 -16.3 -4.2 -5.2 11.0 -1.0
Sweden 0.31 0.42 -10.2 -4.5 -4.3 6.0 0.3
United Kingdom 0.28 0.44 -10.4 -7.1 -5.7 4.7 1.4
Table 10: Aging and labor tax reforms, all countries, 2015-2065
Dependency ratio GDP/capita change (%)
2015 2065 Average 2015-2065
CE MC Gap
MC-CE
Austria 0.28 0.50 -3.9 -2.6 1.3
Belgium 0.29 0.41 -1.2 0.5 1.8
Czech Republic 0.27 0.51 -2.5 -3.1 -0.6
Denmark 0.29 0.42 -0.9 -0.2 0.8
Finland 0.31 0.45 1.0 1.7 0.7
France 0.30 0.47 0.2 2.9 2.7
Germany 0.35 0.60 4.0 1.1 -2.9
Italy 0.34 0.54 -1.6 1.5 3.1
Netherlands 0.28 0.48 1.1 -2.7 -3.8
Poland 0.24 0.58 -2.0 -3.7 -1.6
Slovakia 0.22 0.53 -3.6 -4.6 -1.0
Spain 0.29 0.63 1.5 0.6 -0.9
Sweden 0.31 0.42 0.2 1.5 1.3
United Kingdom 0.28 0.44 -3.1 -2.0 1.1
Table 11: Aging, retirement age and labor tax reforms, all countries, 2015-2065
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Dependency ratio GDP/capita change (%)
2015 2065 Average 2015-2065
CE MC Gap
MC-CE
Austria 0.28 0.50 -7.9 -7.8 0.1
Belgium 0.29 0.41 -4.5 -4.5 0.0
Czech Republic 0.27 0.51 -5.8 -6.8 -1.0
Denmark 0.29 0.42 -3.8 -5.5 -1.7
Finland 0.31 0.45 -3.4 -2.7 0.7
France 0.30 0.47 -4.6 -2.5 2.1
Germany 0.35 0.60 -1.2 -4.1 -2.9
Italy 0.34 0.54 -5.7 -4.4 1.3
Netherlands 0.28 0.48 -2.9 -7.7 -4.8
Poland 0.24 0.58 -7.1 -8.6 -1.5
Slovakia 0.22 0.53 -7.7 -8.8 -1.1
Spain 0.29 0.63 -4.2 -5.3 -1.0
Sweden 0.31 0.42 -4.8 -4.1 0.7
United Kingdom 0.28 0.44 -6.9 -5.6 1.3
Table 12: Aging, pension benefits and labor tax reforms, all countries, 2015-2065
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B Appendix: transition path aging and tax scenario
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Figure 5: Aging and labor tax reforms, key economic variations, 2015-2065
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